Plenary Session

Modern societies depend on tightly coupled electrical and digital infrastructures. Recent conflicts, most visibly the war in Ukraine, have shown how rapidly electromagnetic (EM) effects can translate into operational impact: jamming and spoofing of GNSS, disruption of communications, vulnerability of UAV/UGV ecosystems, and cascading consequences when power and timing are stressed. At the same time, classical “more metal everywhere” hardening is increasingly limited by cost, maintenance burden, and the pace of system upgrades.

This plenary addresses infrastructure protection as a system problem: how to achieve resilient function under a diverse threat ensemble (HEMP/NEMP, HPEM, IEMI, lightning, and high-density RF environments) while controlling lifecycle cost. The talk connects validated EM theory to engineering decisions at scale, electrical grids and substations, platform and facility interfaces, cable/harness networks, and critical services, emphasizing: (i) system coupling-path dominance and interface failure modes, (ii) electromagnetic topology and decomposition into measurable/processable subproblems, (iii) systems of systems hardening designed for maintainability, (iv) probabilistic resilience (not single-scenario pass/fail), and (v) verification strategies that combine measurement, reduced-order models, and uncertainty bounds.

keywords: electromagnetic topology; coupling networks; topology; electric infrastructure; resilience; uncertainty quantification; surrogate modelling;

Traditional rule-based electromagnetic protection frameworks aim to ensure system functionality by defining predictable electromagnetic environments, particularly effective for threats like nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP), where field characteristics over large areas are relatively uniform.
However, this approach faces significant limitations when addressing non-nuclear high-power microwave (HPM) threats, which are highly variable and depend on complex, scenario-specific parameters—including adversary capabilities, operational contexts, and tactical objectives. These uncertainties challenge the efficacy of rigid, one-size-fits-all standards, necessitating a paradigm shift toward adaptive, risk-informed methodologies.
Recent advancements in civilian applications have demonstrated the viability of risk-based electromagnetic protection as a robust alternative. By integrating probabilistic modeling, threat assessment, and system-specific vulnerability analyses, it enables tailored mitigation strategies that balance operational requirements with risk tolerance. This approach acknowledges the dynamic nature of (intentional) electromagnetic interference threats, accounting for variables such as emission sources, propagation paths, and system susceptibility.
Building on this foundation, we present recent efforts of the military sector to adopt similar principles to develop coherent standards that guide project managers in ensuring safe equipment operation. These frameworks emphasize scenario-driven risk evaluation, incorporating both quantitative metrics (e.g., waveforms, exposure distances) and qualitative factors (e.g., mission criticality, adversary capabilities). Such standards aim to harmonize protection requirements with evolving operational demands, fostering resilience against emerging threats while avoiding over-engineering.
We will explore the theoretical underpinnings of risk-based protection, its practical implementation in civilian and military contexts, and the ongoing efforts to standardize risk-informed electromagnetic protection. By bridging the gap between traditional rule-based approaches and modern risk management, it offers a flexible, future-ready solution to safeguard critical systems in an increasingly complex electromagnetic threat landscape.

High-power electromagnetic pulse (HPEM) environments present significant electromagnetic interference challenges to the safe and stable operation of controlled fusion facilities. This paper provides an overview of the complex HPEM environments and effects in both magnetic confinement fusion (MCF) and laser inertial confinement fusion (ICF) facilities. In MCF devices such as tokamaks, plasma and coil currents generate strong stray magnetic fields, while high-voltage switching operations in systems like Marx generators contribute to the electromagnetic environment. The primary focus is on ICF facilities, where intense laser-target interactions generate super thermal electrons that escape the target chamber and excite broadband electromagnetic pulses (Electron-EMP) in the interior of the target chamber. Furthermore, the intense X-rays produced during fusion burn interact with facility structures, inducing various classes of electromagnetic pulses. When X-rays irradiate cables directly, they generate Cable-SGEMP. When X-rays interact with the target chamber cavity, they produce three distinct effects: External-SGEMP and Cavity-SGEMP from interactions with the outer and inner cavity surfaces respectively, and Source Region EMP (SREMP) in the target chamber room due to X-rays penetrating the chamber wall. Switching operations in the energy storage area further contribute to the overall electromagnetic environment. Understanding these complex and interrelated HPEM generation mechanisms is essential for developing effective electromagnetic shielding and protection strategies for next-generation fusion reactors.

Information security is implemented across multiple layers, from applications and protocols to networks. However, the ultimate root of trust resides in hardware; once this physical foundation is compromised, upper-layer protections can no longer guarantee security. This structural dependency closely parallels a fundamental principle of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC): reliable system operation requires electromagnetic integrity at the hardware level. In this sense, information security and EMC share a common philosophy—security by design and EMC by design—both requiring that physical-layer considerations be incorporated from the earliest stages of system architecture.

This plenary lecture focuses on electromagnetic security (EMSEC), a critical security challenge at the intersection of hardware security and electromagnetic compatibility. Electromagnetic-mediated threats are first organized into a three-part taxonomy consisting of Direct Emission (DE), Carrier-Coupled Emission (CCE), and Actively Induced Emission (AE), and their underlying mechanisms are discussed. Hardware-level security has been addressed through a variety of approaches spanning software, algorithms, cryptographic protocols, and hardware design. However, many existing countermeasures remain dependent on specific algorithms, implementations, or protocols. In contrast, mitigation based on established EMC technologies directly addresses electromagnetic phenomena at the physical layer and therefore provides strong versatility independent of higher-layer algorithms or protocols.

The lecture further highlights that conventional EMC techniques—including EMI suppression, shielding, and EMC-based protection—can function not only as tools for compliance and reliability but also as effective countermeasures against malicious physical attacks on hardware. In addition to information leakage through compromising emanations, the talk addresses the emerging threat of combined electromagnetic attacks, in which compromising emanations interact with intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) to create new vulnerabilities. By bridging EMC and information security, this plenary lecture proposes a new role for the EMC community in enabling resilient and secure next-generation electronic systems.

Electromagnetic pulses (EMP) generated in ultra-intense laser–plasma experiments are widely recognized as a major source of interference in experimental diagnostics and electronic systems. These emissions can disrupt data acquisition, introduce significant noise in detectors, and occasionally cause failures in nearby electronic equipment. As a result, previous efforts have primarily focused on technical mitigation strategies such as electromagnetic shielding, grounding optimization, and detector protection. However, comparatively limited attention has been given has been given to the fundamental characteristics of EMP generation and the broader electromagnetic phenomena associated with laser–plasma interactions.
This presentation discusses the formation of plasma in ambient air induced by ultra-intense laser pulses and the resulting laser filamentation and generation of radiations. By examining the interaction between laser-produced plasma with air media or solid targets, we investigate the mechanisms responsible for plasma filamentation, x-ray generation, and electromagnetic pulse emission. In this presentation, we also propose that, beyond mitigating unwanted EMP effects, laser-generated plasma in air could provide opportunities for controlling electromagnetic phenomena. In particular, laser-induced plasma structures could potentially enable applications such as electromagnetic wave guiding and lightning guiding, suggesting various possibilities for future research and technological development involving laser–plasma interactions in air.
This research was supported by the Challengeable Future Defense Technology Research and Development Program through the Agency For Defense Development(ADD) funded by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration(DAPA) in 2026(No.915107201